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Rogers: Criminal Law and Procedure

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
EUGENE F. ROGERS*
The Supreme Court of South Carolina during the review
period commencing April 1, 1961, through March 31, 1962,
decided 18 cases involving substantive and procedural rules
of criminal law. Of the 18 cases, 5 were reversed. The
Court reviewed five cases where the verdict of the jury made
the death penalty mandatory and three of the five appellants
were granted new trials.
One-third of all cases or six of the cases appealed to the
Supreme Court were cases involving civil rights. One of these
cases was reversed, and two reversed in part and affirmed
in part. The other five cases, while not reversed by our
South Carolina Supreme Court, cannot yet be considered to
be the law of the state. They have been appealed to the
United States Supreme Court. By the time this article is
published the United States Supreme Court should have
made a decision in some of the appealed cases.
CIVIL RIGHTS
Trespass
In City of Greenville v. Peterson,' the defendants were
convicted of trespass after notice in violation of Section
16-388, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1952, as amended.
From this conviction they appealed to the Supreme Court.
The defendants, all Negroes, were seated at a lunch
counter
inthe S. H. Kress Store in Greenville, South Carolina. Because of the custom that only white persons shall be served at
the counter, the store manager announced that it was closed,
the lights were extinguished, and all persons were requested
to leave. There were some white persons at the counter
who left, but all of the Negroes refused to leave. There
were some ten Negroes above sixteen years of age and four
under sixteen years of age.
The Code section under which they were prosecuted provides: 2
*Member of the firm of Rogers and McDonald, Columbia, S. C.
1. 239 S. C. 298, 122 S. E. 2d 826 (1961).
2. CODz OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 16-388 (1952).
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Any person . . . who, having entered into the . . .
place of business . . . of another person . . . and fails

and refuses... to leave immediately upon being ordered
. . . to do so by the person in possession . . . shall, on

conviction, be fined not more than $100.00, . . .
Defendants, after conviction, appealed, contending that
their arrest and conviction was in furtherance of a custom of
racial segregation in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States.
Our Court dismissed this contention and stated:
The Fourteenth Amendment erects no shield against
merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful, Shelley v. Kraemer, 314 U. S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836,
92 L. Ed. 1161, 3 A.L.R. 2d 441; and the operator of a
privately owned business may accept some customers
and reject others on purely personal grounds in the
absence of a statute to the contrary, Alpaugh v. Wolverton, 184 Va. 943, 36 S. E. 2d 906. In the absence of a
statute forbidding discrimination based on race or color,
the operator of a privately owned place of business has
the right to select the clientele he will serve irrespective
of color, State v. Avent, 253 N. C. 580, 118 S. E. 2d 47.
Although the general public has an implied license to
enter any retail store, the proprietor or his agent is at
liberty to revoke this license at any time and to eject such
individual if he refuses to leave when requested to do
so, Annotation 9 A.L.R. 379; Annotation 33 A.L.R. 421;
Brookside-Pratt Mining Co. v. Booth, 211 Ala. 268, 100
So. 240, 33 A.L.R. 417; and may lawfully forbid any and
all persons, regardless of reason, race or religion, to
enter or remain upon any part of his premises which
are not devoted to public use, Henderson v. Trailway
Bus Company, 194 F. Supp. 423, 426.
In the next case decided on this point, City of Charleston
v. Mitchell,3 the defendants were charged with trespass and
with opposing and interfering with police in discharge of
duties. The facts in this case were substantially identical to
the facts in the preceding case with the exception that the
offense occurred in the city of Charleston and the defendants
were charged with simple trespass rather than trespass
3. 239 S. C. 376, 123 S. E. 2d 512 (1961).
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after notice. The defendants asserted that since the store of
*S. H. Kress & Company was open to the public, they were
there as business invitees and the refusal to serve them because of their race was a denial of their constitutional rights.
They did not attack Section 16-386 of the Code (the trespass
statute) as being unconstitutional but contended that their
rights were abridged in its application, in that they were
invitees and were refused service because of their race.
The Court dismissed this contention with the following
language:
Section 16-386 of our Code is not a racial segregation
one. It forbids any person, irrespective of his race
or color, to make entry upon the lands of another after
notice from the owner or tenant prohibiting such entry.
There is no statute in this State which forbids discrimination by the owner of a restaurant of people on
account of race or color. In the absence of a statute
forbidding discrimination based on race or color, the
rule is well established that an operator of a privately
owned restaurant privately operated in a privately owned
building, has the right to select the clientele he will serve
and to make such selection based on color or race if he
so desires. This rule has been repeatedly recognized by
the Appellate Courts of this country.
City of Columbia v. Barr- is another case with similar facts.
The Court affirmed appellants' conviction for trespass under
authority of Greenville v. Peterson5 and City of Charleston
v. Mitchell:
ObstructingJustice
In City of Charlestonv. Mitchell,7 defendants were charged
with interfering with police in discharge of their offical
duties. The interference complained of was the failure of
the appellants to leave the premises after being ordered and
requested to do so by the Chief of Police. The question on
appeal was whether or not the act of the appellants in doing
"nothing" and refusing to leave the premises in question,
4. 239 S. C. 395,123 S. E. 2d 521 (1961).
5. 239 S. C. 298, 122 S. E. 2d 826 (1961).

6. 239 S. C. 376, 123 S. E. 2d 512 (1961).
7. 239 S. C. 376, 123 S. E. 2d 512 (1961).
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after being ordered and requested to do so, amounted to an
unlawful interference by them with the Chief of Police.
The Court in quoting 47 C.J.S., at page 83, said:
"Interfere" has been said to import action, not mere
inaction, an active rather than a passive condition,
and has been defined as meaning to interpose, to prevent
some action, sometimes in a bad sense to intermeddle,
to check or hamper, and, specifically to do something
which hinders or prevents or tends to prevent the
performance of legal duty. In its broadest aspects "interfere" bears the significance of "disarrange", "disturb",
"hinder."
The Court concluded that the conduct of the appellants in
refusing obedience to the request of the Chief of Police, was
merely inaction on their part and did not constitute interference with an officer in the discharge of his duty.
Resisting Arrest
In City of Colzmbia v. Bouie,8 appellants were charged
with breach of the peace. They were convicted in the lower
court and appealed. This offense occurred in one of Columbia's
eating establishments. The appeal from resisting arrest was
based on insufficient evidence to convict. The evidence indicated that the defendant's resistance was his failure to
obey immediately the officer's order, with the result that
the latter "had to pick him up out of the seat."
The Court concluded that "resisting arrest is one form of
the common law offense of obstructing justice; and the
use of force is not an essential ingredient of it." The Court
decided however, that'the momentary delay in responding
to the officer's command did not amount to resistance within
the intent of the law.
Breach of the Peace
In State v. Edwards,9 the appellants, 187 in number, were
convicted in the Magistrate's Court of the common law crime
of breach of the peace. The charges arose out of certain activities in which the appellants were engaged in about the State
House grounds in the City of Columbia. The appellants after
8. 239 S. C. 570, 124 S. E. 2d 332 (1962).
9. 239 S. C. 339,123 S. E. 2d 247 (1961).
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attending a meeting at a church walked in groups of approximately 15 from the church along public sidewalks to the
State House grounds and paraded about the grounds in
protest to the General Assembly and to the general public
against the laws and customs of the State relative to segregation of the races. The appellants stated such demonstrations
were to continue until their conscience told them that it had
lasted long enough. At the time the General Assembly was
in session. When appellants reached the State House grounds
they were met by police authorities who permitted them to
parade for about 45 minutes. The parading affected the
flow of pedestrian and vehicular traffic and the police authorities warned the leaders that they must disperse and upon
their failure to have the group dispersed all were arrested and
charged with breach of the peace.
After conviction, the defendants appealed contending that
their arrest and conviction deprived them of their constitutional right of freedom of speech and assembly.
The Court used this occasion to define the term "breach
of the peace" as follows:
Breach of the peace is a common law offense which is
not susceptible of exact definition. It is a generic term,
embracing "a great variety of conduct destroying or
menacing public order and tranquility". Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900, 905, 84 L. Ed.
1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352. State v. Randolph, 239 S. C.
79, 121 S. E. 2d 349, 350.
The general definition of the offense of breach of the
peace approved in our decisions is that found in 8 Am.
Jur. 834, Section 3 as follows: "In general terms, a breach
of the peace is a violation of i5ublic order, a disturbance
of the public tranquility, by any act or conduct inciting
to violence . . . . it includes any violation of any law
enacted to preserve peace and good order. It may consist
of an act of violence or an act likely to produce violence.
It is not necessary that the peace be actually broken to
lay the foundation for a prosecution for this offense.
If what is done is unjustifiable and unlawful, tending
with sufficient directness to break the peace, no more
is required. Nor is actual personal violence an essential
element in the offense . .. "
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By "peace", as used in the law in this connection, is
meant the tranquility enjoyed by citizens of a muncipality or community where good order reigns among
its members, which is the natural right of all persons
in political society.
The Court concluded that in this instance the appellants
disobeyed the orders of the police officers and these orders
were under all of the facts and circumstances reasonable and
were motivated solely by a proper concern for the preservation
of order and prevention of further interference with traffic
upon the public streets and sidewalks.
Preparationof Warrants
In State v. Randolph,' the defendants were convicted in
Magistrate's Court of conspiring to breach the peace. From
adverse judgment from the Court of General Sessions they
appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the warrant
was defective and failed to set forth facts constituting the
alleged offense. The warrant in effect stated that the appellants "did combine, confederate and conspire, together
one with the other, to commit a breach of the peace, . . ."
against the peace and dignity of the State. The appellants
at the time the case was called for trial moved to dismiss
the warrant on the ground that it did not set forth the
offense charged plainly and substantially.
In upholding appellants' contention the Court cited Article
I, Section 18 of the South Carolina Constitution, which
provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right "to be fully informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation." The Court also cited Section 43-111 requiring proceedings in Magistrates' Courts in criminal cases
to be commenced on information plainly and substantially
setting forth the offense charged. The Court concluded that
the defendant had the fundamental right to be informed of
the nature of the offense charged against him, and that in
the instant case no facts constituting the offense were stated.
The only thing stated in the warrant was the name of the
offense that the defendants were charged with committing.
In all the civil rights cases the court is to be commended
for its logic, judgment and reasoning in reaching its conclu10. 239 S. C.79, 121 S. E. 2d 349 (1961).
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sions. It is readily apparent that the Court carefully weighed
the rights of the defendants and carefully compared the facts
in each case with the statutes, ordinances or law which they
were charged with .violating. It is difficult to see how the
Court could have reached any conclusion other than that
which it did in the premises. It will be interesting to note
what the United States Supreme Court does with the decisions
of our Supreme Court which have been appealed to it.
Appointment of Counsel in Non-Capital Cases
In Shelton v. State and Manning," the appellant in a habeas
corpus proceeding called to his aid the United States Constitution. He had entered a plea of guilty to assault of a high
and aggravated nature in 1958. Fifteen months later he filed
a writ of habeas corpus contending that his sentence was
invalid because he was not represented by counsel at the time
he pleaded guilty.
The case is significant in that the Court for the first time
appears to recognize the requirement of the United States
Constitution that counsel be appointed to represent a defendant
in non-capital cases in state courts where the circumstances
of the particular case are such that without counsel the
furtherance of justice would be defeated. There is no statute
in this state requiring that counsel be appointed to represent
one charged with a commission of a crime except where the
charge is a capital offense.'12 State v. Hallman"3 is the only
other case in the state bearing on this question. In that
case the Court refused to make a decision as to whether or
not there were any non-capital cases where a defendant would
be entitled to have the Court appoint an attorney to represent
him. In the instant case, while the Court recognized the right
of counsel to a non-capital defendant in some instances, it
concluded that the appellant had not been unfairly treated
and that he was not entitled to a new trial under the showing
made.
Rape
During the review period there were four rape cases which
were reviewed by the Supreme Court. In each of them the
death penalty had been made mandatory by the verdict of the
jury. New trials were granted to defendants in three cases.
11. 239 S. C. 535, 123 S. E. 2d 867 (1962).
12. CODE OF LAWs OF SOUTH CAROLINA . 17-507 (1952).

13. 232 S. C. 489, 102 S. E. 2d 873 (1958).
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In State v. Worthy, 14 the defendant requested the Court to
permit a guilty plea with a recommendation to mercy. This
was after the jury had been selected and sworn. The State
refused and the trial proceeded. At the conclusion of the
trial, counsel for defendant made the following request: "I
would like for you to point out to them, . . . that they can
bring back guilty with recommendation to the mercy of the
Court, without any reason at all, they don't have to have
anything to go on, it is in their province to do that, and
that no one can criticize them for it . . . " The trial judge
declined this instruction and upon conviction this appeal followed.
Justice Legge, writing what he apparently thought was a
dissenting opinion but which became majority opinion by a
Court divided three-two, wrote a scholarly review of the
history of the recommendation to mercy statutes.
The majority opinion held that the trial judge errs if
he refuses to instruct a jury, as requested by defendant's
counsel, with regard to their unrestricted power to recommend
mercy. Justice Legge stated:
. . . It is therefore of vital importance to the accused
that the jury be charged as to its power under the
statute (Section 16-72 giving the jury power to recommend mercy upon conviction of rape) for it is a part
of the law peculiarly applicable in a death case. The
accused has no right whatever to such recommendation;
he has a substantial right, under Article V, Section 26
of the Constitution of 1895, to have the jury instructed as
to the meaning of that statute...
. . . the jury's power to recommend mercy is not dependent upon its view of the facts and circumstances
revealed by the evidence, but is absolute, unlimited, and
not subject to review.
Every conclusion by a jury, other than that with respect
to recommendation to mercy, is required by law and by
the juror's oath to be based upon the evidence or lack
of it. In the absence of instruction as to that distinction,
I am convinced of the likelihood that the average juror
would think that his power to recommend mercy is limited
to considerations arising from the evidence. The distinc14. 239 S. C. 449, 123 S. E. 2d 835 (1961).
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tion is a vital one, and in my opinion the trial judge's refusal to point it out deprived the defendant of a substantial right under Article V, Section 26.
Course And Conduct of Trial
State v. Sharpe15 and State v. Davis,16 attracted national
interest. The two cases were tried in the same term of court
and in the former, Sharpe, a Negro, was tried on an indictment charging that he committed rape upon a white
woman, while Davis, a white man, was tried on an indictment
charging that he committed rape .upon a Negro woman. Both
were convicted without a mercy recommendation and both
appealed.
In his appeal Sharpe contended that the Court should set
aside the verdict of the jury because it was the product of the
atmosphere and surroundings in which the case was tried.
He contended that on the previous day Davis, a white man,
had been convicted, without recommendation to mercy, of
raping a Negro woman and by reason of such trial preceding
that of the appellant, a general atmosphere of hostility was
created which was prejudicial to his rights and which denied
him a fair and impartial trial. Mr. Justice Moss, speaking
for the Court, had this to say:
The power of the law to take the life of human beings
for a violation thereof is one which should be and is
exercised with extreme caution. The frailties of human
nature are so manifest and manifold until the law should
and does place around the defendant, whose life would
be taken for a violation of the law, every safeguard to
enable such defendant to secure a fair and impartial
trial. When it is made to appear that anything has occurred which may have improperly influenced the action
of the jury, the accused should be granted a new trial,
although he may appear to be ever so guilty, because it
may be said that his guilt has not been ascertained in
the manner prescribed by law. This Court has taken the
position that in all cases involving the life of the defendant, it is not bound down to a consideration of the exceptions raised, but if anything appear in the record
which would warrant a reversal, this Court will consider
15. 238 S. C. 258, 122 S. E. 2d 622 (1961).
16. 238 S. C. 280, 122 S. E. 2d 633 (1961).
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that matter as if raised by the exceptions. What effect
improper argument of a Solicitor, even though made
in another case, yet in the presence of a jury panel from
which a jury was later selected to try the appellant, is
impossible to say. State v. Britt et al., 235 S. C. 395, 111
S. E. 2d 669. Every case should be tried in a calm and
judicial atmosphere so that the arbiters of the fact may
not be affected by any outside interference or extraneous
influences. We do not know what effect the trial of the
previous case and the argument of the Solicitor therein
may have had upon the trial of the appellant. We, therefore, conclude that in order to remove all doubt as to
whether the appellant received the fair and impartial
trial guaranteed to him by the Constitutions of this State
and of the United States that this Court should reverse
the conviction of the appellant and remand the case to
the lower Court for a new trial.
Improper Argument of Prosecuting Attorney
In State v. Davis,17 the solicitor in his argument made the
following statement:
I have one or more similar cases to the one being tried,
to be brought up later in this court, and if you turn this
defendant loose you might as well be turning these other
defendants loose also, because if you turn this man loose
I'm going to turn the others loose.
The Court considered this comment by the solicitor and
had this to say:
The reference was obviously to the impending trial of
Sharpe; and the plain threat was a nolle prosequi in that
case. In the circumstances before detailed, it would be
hard to conceive of a statement more likely to excite the
emotions of the jury and to coerce a conviction. The
solicitor should prosecute vigorously; he must prosecute
fairly, for the concern of the state, whose representative
he is, is not that a defendant shall be convicted, but that
justice shall be done.
Based on the foregoing the Court reversed the judgment
of the lower court and remanded the case for a new trial.
It is of interest that this defendant on retrial was acquitted.
17. 238 S. C. 280, 122 S. E. 2d 633 (1961).
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In State v. Robinson,S the defendant was convicted of rape
and on appeal contended that the trial judge committed error
in refusing to order a new trial on the ground that the solicitor, in his argument to the jury, commented on the fact that
the defendant did not take the witness stand and testify in his
own behalf. The solicitor in his argument made a number
of statements and then asked the question: "is that contradicted or denied?" On another occasion, after making a
statement, he continued with this statement, "and it is certainly not disputed or denied". The Court held that it was
improper for the solicitor to comment on or to make any reference to the fact that the accused failed to testify as a
witness in his own behalf but decided that it was unreasonable to conclude that the argument of the solicitor conveyed
to the minds of the jurors the fact that the appellant had nbt
testified in the case. The Court went on to say that if by any
chance any juror received such an impression, its effect was
removed by the charge of the trial judge when he charged
them that a defendant was under no obligation to testify in
his own behalf and the fact that the defendant does not
testify cannot and must not be considered against him under
any circumstances.
In State v. Edge worth,' 9 the defendant was convicted of
housebreaking and larceny. The defendant appealed on the
ground, among others, that the solicitor's argument was
improper because he commented on the fact that the defendant stated to the sheriff upon arrest, "I am not talking until
I get a lawyer." The lower court ruled that the defendant
was under no duty to talk to the sheriff and was within his
rights in asking to be permitted to talk with his attorney.
The Court concluded that it was improper for the solicitor
to have made any comment about defendant having requested
an attorney and said the following:
There was no impelling reason why the solicitor should
have made any comment thereby, as it is always the duty
of the prosecuting attorney to treat the defendant in a
fair and impartial manner and this applies while making
argument to the jury.
The Court went on to say, however, that the failure of the
circuit judge to restrain the solicitor in his argument in this
18. 238 S. C. 140, 119 S. E. 2d 671 (1961).
19. 239 S. C. 10, 121 S. E. 2d 248 (1961).
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particular case did not warrant setting aside the verdict on
that ground as the Court could not order a new trial for every
departure from the record.
Photographers Taking Pictures in Courtroom
In State v. Sharpe,20 the trial judge permitted photographers
and newsreel men to make pictures in the presence of the jury
during the trial of the case. While the case was reversed on
other grounds, the Court reviewed the judge's action in permitting the photographers and newsreel men to make the
pictures. It concluded that the trial judge committed error
in permitting the photographs to be taken and cited Canon
35 of the American Bar Association's Canon of Judicial Ethics.
The Court had this to say:
We agree that Canon 35, above quoted, should be enforced
in the trial of cases in the courts of this State. The Canon
sets forth a standard which should govern the conduct of
judicial proceedings. To allow a deviation therefrom
would permit distractions or disturbances that are inimical to judicious conduct.
Entrapment
It is elementary in criminal law that entrapment by an
officer and his procurement of the commission of a crime
by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the
trickery, persuasion or fraud of the officer is a good defense.
Surprisingly enough, South Carolina has no case prior to the
case of State v. Jacobs2 1 setting forth this principal. To the
contrary, the only case on the point is State v. Rippey,2 2 which
indicates that South Carolina might not recognize the defense
of entrapment. In that case the Court said, ". .. we do not approve of the prosecution inducing anyone to violate the law
in order that he may be caught, yet there are times that it
is the only way that a violator of law can be entrapped".
In State v. Jacobs,2 the defendant was convicted of conspiracy
to kidnap and appealed on the ground, among others, that
he was entrapped into the alleged conspiracy and that it was
instigated by an agent of the sheriff of Laurens County. In
20. 238 S. C. 258, 122 S. E. 2d 622 (1961).
21. 238 S. C. 234, 119 S. E. 2d 735 u1961).
22. 127 S. C. 550, 122 S. E. 397 0024).
23. 238 S. C. 234,119 S. E. 2d 735 (1961).
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this case the Court, while holding that no entrapment had
occurred, recognized the doctrine and said, "It is a general
rule that where the criminal intent originates in the mind of
the entrapping person and the accused is lured into the commission of a crime which he had otherwise no intention of
committing in order to prosecute him therefor, no conviction
may be had, though the committing of the act is not affected
by any question of consent."
Intoxicating Liquors
In State v. Cunningham,24 the defendant was convicted of
unlawful possession of fruit jars being an apparatus, appliance
and device for manufacturing alcoholic liquors. He appealed,
contending that there was nothing to show that fruit jars
were suitable for use in manufacturing liquor and that the
evidence at most showed that he was simply taking jars to
the still to transport whiskey which had already been manufactured.
In order to fully understand the decision of the Court the
statute under which the defendant was prosecuted must be
set out. Section 4-103.2, South Carolina Code for 1952,
provides:
The unexplained possession of any part or parts of any
still, apparatus or appliance, or any device or substitute
therefor, commonly or generally used for or that is suitable to be used in the manufacture of prohibited alcohol
liquors shall be prima facie evidence of the violiation of
Section 4-103.1.
Section 4-103.1 makes it unlawful to manufacture alcoholic
liquors.
The jury decided that the defendant was not guilty of manufacturing whiskey but that the jars constituted an "apparatus, appliance or device" used for the purpose of manufacturing liquor. The Court held that in this case there was
no evidence that fruit jars were suitable for use in manufacturing liquor. They concluded, "They are certainly not
specifically designed for that purpose and are in common
use in many if not most homes for other purposes." The
record in the case was silent as to what type of receptacle was
being used to receive the liquor as it came from the condenser.
24. 239 S. C. 212, 122 S. E. 2d 289 (1961).
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The still operators may have used a tub or barrel for that
purpose, the Court observed. The Court reversed the lower
court, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to warrant the defendant's conviction on the ground that the jars
were an apparatus, appliance or device to be used in the manufacturing of liquor.

Assault And Battery
In State v.
appellant with one boy friend drove to
another boy friend's home wherein the first boy friend assaulted the second boy friend. The evidence indicated that
the appellant, while the first boy friend was committing
the assault, slid over in the driver's seat, backed the car up,
straightened it out and when the first boy friend had finished
beating boy friend No. 2 and after he got into the car, she
drove off. Upon conviction of assault and battery of a high
and aggravated nature the appellant appealed, contending that
there was no evidence which reasonably tended to prove her
guilt or no evidence from which her guilt might be fairly
and logically deduced. The Court declined to favorably consider this argument on the part of appellant and stated:
If several persons in pursuance of a common design to
commit an unlawful act, whether it be felony or misdemeanor, set out together or in small parties, and each
takes the part agreed upon or assigned him, some to
commit the act, others to watch at proper distances and
stations to prevent interference or surprise or to encourage the commission of the unlawful act or to favor, if
necessary, the escape of those immediately engaged in
the commision of the unlawful act, under these circumstances, if the unlawful act is committed, the act of one
is the act of all and all are presumed to be present and
guilty; for this would be in pursuance of a common
purpose in a common cause with them each operating
in his station at one and the same instant to arrive at
a common end. The act of each would tend to give
countenance, encouragement and protection to the whole
gang and to insure the success of the conunon undertaking
in the commission of the unlawful act.
The Court held that the evidence in the case was ample to
submit to the jury the question of whether or not the apPrince,2 5

25. 240 S. C. 96, 124 S. E. 2d 778 (1962).
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pellant and her first boy friend went to the home of Davis,
the victim, for the unlawful purpose of committing an assault
upon him.
Several other cases were considered by the Court, but none
of them presented novel or unusual questions and none of the
cases contained questions of sufficient significance to permit
review here.
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